Should more ambiguity averse agents exert more effort ?. by Gollier, Christian & Alary, David
Should more ambiguity averse agents exert more
e⁄ort?
David Alary￿ Christian Golliery
Very Preliminary, Work in progress
August 2008
Following the pioneering work by Ellsberg (1961), ample evidence in favor
of ambiguity aversion has been accrued1. It suggests that agents systematically
violate Savage￿ s "Sure Thing Principle". More precisely, it seems that how we
evaluate uncertainty depends on how precise our information about the underly-
ing probabilities are - as opposed to the linearity of expected utilities in beliefs.
The Stern Review (Stern (2007)) put a tremendous pressure for acting quickly
and heavily against global warming while the Copenhagen Consensus (Lomborg
(2004)) put top priority to preventive e⁄ort on health and development. In both
cases, individuals may act in order to reduce the probability that the risk is real-
ized at some cost. They may also act in order to reduce the loss in case the risk
is realized. Then agents have to choose their self protection and self-insurance
level as de￿ne by Erlhich and Becker (1972).
While risks on health and or development are well-known (relatively) the
future e⁄ects of global warming are quite ambiguous. The IPCC had de￿ned 4
families of possible emission scenarii. All of them predict an increase of aver-
age temperature however the distribution of the possible increases are not the
same. Moreover individuals do not know exactly which one is the true one. One
main objective of several policies is to induce economic agents to exert an e⁄ort
in their greenhouse gas emission. Then a natural question is does ambiguity
aversion reduce or increase preventive e⁄orts. Several experimental contribu-
tions address this question. Following Shogren (1990), Di Mauro and Ma¢ oletti
(1996) investigate how individuals value risk reduction when the probability of
loss is ambiguous. We choose to address this question from a theoretical point of
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1The Ellsberg-Paradox refers to the outcome of an experiment (Ellsberg (1961)), where
a majority of participants￿choices were inconsistent with expected utility theory. In an urn
containing 90 balls, there were 30 red balls and the remaining were either black or yellow in
unknown proportions. If participants won a bet, they received $100. A large group preferred
to bet on drawing red vs. betting on black. However, in a second stage they preferred to bet
on not drawing red vs. betting on not drawing black. Within an expected utility model, one
cannot ￿nd a set of beliefs compatible with such preferences. Note, that betting on (or against)
red is indeed an unambiguous act with well-de￿ned winning probabilities, while betting on (or
against) black is not. For a survey on the literature consult e.g. Camerer and Weber (1992).
1view. We consider individuals with ￿smooth ambiguity preferences￿as proposed
by Klibano⁄, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005, 2007). Our paper is technically re-
lated to Gollier (2006). In a ￿nance context, he investigates comparative statics
results of an increase in ambiguity aversion on the demand for risky assets. He
shows that, in general, omitting ambiguity aversion cannot be corrected for by
assuming a higher degree of risk aversion. Treich (2008) also consider the e⁄ect
of ambiguity aversion on self protection. He investigates the e⁄ect of ambiguity
aversion on the value of statistical life in a model of state dependant utility.
We show in this paper that ambiguity aversion may reduce the preventive
e⁄ort an agent may undertake. Indeed, ambiguity averse agents behave as an
expected utility maximizer with a distorted belief on the scenarii. They over-
weight the worse scenario. Under the condition that marginal expected utility
and expected utility are anti-commonotonic, the marginal expected bene￿t is
lower in the worse scenario that in the most favorable scenario. The individuals
valuate less the preventive e⁄ort. The same e⁄ect exists when we consider self
insurance rather than self protection.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
basic model. In Section 3 we characterize the e⁄ect of ambiguity aversion on
self protection. Section 4 investigates the e⁄ect of ambiguity aversion on self
insurance. Section 5 concludes.
1 The model
We consider an agent whose preferences are describe by an increasing and con-
cave utility function u(x). She faces a risky wealth e ! = !￿e l which is ambiguous,
! being the initial wealth and e l the potential loss. We assume that there are




ps = 1. The distribution of probability p over these S states
of nature is a function of a parameter ￿ that can take value 1;2;:::;n with prob-
ability q1;:::;qn, respectively. The agent has the opportunity to invest in self
protecting activities i:e:activities that may modify the probabilities of loss. In
order to capture these opportunities, we assume that the probabilities depend
on an e⁄ort e such that p￿ ￿ p￿ (e):2 This investment has a non monetary cost
c(e)3 with c0(e) > 0 and c00(e) > 0. We assume that the consumer is ambiguity
averse in the sense of Klibano⁄, Marinacci, Mukerje (2005).
The agent chooses e in order to maximize her welfare:
max
e V (e) =
n X
￿=1
q￿￿[U￿ (e) ￿ c(e)] = E￿[F (￿;e)]
2The e⁄ort reduces the probability ph￿ with p0
h￿ (e) < 0 for all h = f1;:::;S ￿ 1g and
p00
h￿ (e) > 0 8￿ = 1;2;:::;n. Then p0





3Our results remain true if the cost of e⁄ort is monetary and ambiguous.




The ￿rst order condition is
n X
￿=1





￿s (e)u(!s) ￿ c0 (e)
#
= 0 (1)















q￿￿0 [U￿ (e) ￿ c(e)]
n X
￿=1
q￿￿0 [U￿ (e) ￿ c(e)]
Again the agent behaves as a expected utility maximizer with a distorted
probability distribution of the initials beliefs q￿.
Assume now that the agent is ambiguity neutral: ￿0 is constant. The ￿rst




￿ (e) ￿ c0 (e) = 0 (2)
The optimal self-protecting activity e￿ is as usual such that the marginal bene￿t
is equal to the marginal cost of e⁄ort.
2 The e⁄ect of ambiguity aversion on self-protection
and self-insurance
2.1 Self protection
In order to study the e⁄ect of ambiguity aversion on the optimal self protection
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In order to analyze the sign of V 0(e￿) we will make use of the following
concept.
De￿nition 1 Two vectors (x1;:::;xn) and (y1;:::;yn) are said to be anti-commonotonic
if, for all (i;j) 2 f1;ng
2 ; xi ￿ xj implies yi ￿ yj:
Take the case where the entries x￿ of the vector are ranked and ordered such
that they are decreasing in ￿. Such a vector is anti-commonotonic with any
vector of the same dimension whose entries y￿ are increasing in ￿.4
Proposition 2 If the self protection has the same e⁄ect in each scenarii, am-
biguity aversion has no e⁄ect on the optimal preventive activity chosen by the
agent.
If the marginal expected utility U0
￿ (e) and the expected utility U￿ (e) are anti-
commonotonic then an ambiguity averse agent chooses a lower self protecting
e⁄ort than an ambiguity neutral one.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we consider that the values U￿ (e) are ranked
and ordered such that they are increasing in ￿. Since ￿ is concave, we know that
^ q￿ is dominated by q￿ in the sense of the monotone likelihood ratio5. Moreover,
considering that U0
￿ (e) and U￿ (e) are anti-commonotonic implies that U0
￿ (e) is
decreasing in ￿. Then we obtain that V 0(e￿) is negative. From the second order
condition we know that V 0(e￿) is decreasing in e implying that the optimal e⁄ort
for an ambiguity averse agent b e is lower than e￿ the ambiguity neutral agent￿ s
optimal e⁄ort.
The intuition is the following. Due to ambiguity aversion, the agent behaves
as an expected utility maximizer with a distorted belief on the scenarii. In-
deed she overweights the worse scenario with respect to the true distribution
of scenarii. Then if the marginal bene￿t of e⁄ort is increasing with the quality
of scenarii then the agent valuates the preventive e⁄ort less than an ambiguity
neutral agent. Since the marginal cost of e⁄ort is the same whatever is the
ambiguity aversion, ambiguity averse agents choose a lower preventive e⁄ort.
2.2 Self insurance
Consider now, an agent that faces a risk of loss (or accident) and can engage
in e⁄ort of self-insurance rather than self-protection. For a level e of e⁄ort, his
wealth is ! ￿ ls(e) with probability p￿s in each state s 2 f0;1;:::;Sg. Note
that ps￿ no longer depends on the e⁄ort e but still depends on ￿ a parameter of
ambiguity that can take value 1;2;:::;n with probability q1;:::;qn, respectively.
As before, the function c(e) can be thought of as the cost of e⁄ort. The function
4The de￿nition is by Gollier and Gierlinger [2007].
5For a formal proof see Gollier [2006].
4l(e) is the loss, and ! is the initial wealth. We assume that the loss is positive:
ls(e) > 0. Moreover, we assume that ls(e) is decreasing. Then, the e⁄ort
decrease the loss rather than the probability of loss.




q￿￿[U￿ (e) ￿ c(e)]




The optimal action e maximizes the expected utility V (e): Therefore b e is
solution of the following condition
n X
￿=1
q￿￿0 [U￿ (e) ￿ c(e)][U0





p￿s [￿u0 [! ￿ ls(e)]l0
s(e)]





￿ (e) ￿ c0 (e) = 0
with
b q￿ =
q￿￿0 [U￿ (e) ￿ c(e)]
n X
￿=1
q￿￿0 [U￿ (e) ￿ c(e)]
Notice that this condition is equivalent to the one we obtain in the case of self




￿ (e) = c0 (e)








￿ (e￿). Again this condition is exactly the condition (2).
It follows that proposition 2 is also true when we consider self insurance
rather than self protection.
3 Self protection against both risk and ambigu-
ity
We assume now that the action undertake by the agent does not only modify
the probability of the state of the world but also the probability of the scenario
5￿. In order to capture this e⁄ect, we assume that q￿ is a function of e the self
protecting e⁄ort with q0
j￿(e) < 0 and q00
j￿(e) > 0.
The agent chooses e in order to maximize her welfare:
max
e V (e) =
n X
￿=1
q￿ (e)￿[U￿ (e) ￿ c(e)]




The ￿rst order condition is
n X
￿=1











￿ (e)￿[U￿ (e) ￿ c(e)] = 0
(3)















￿ (e)￿[U￿ (e) ￿ c(e)]
n X
￿=1
q￿(e)￿0 [U￿ (e) ￿ c(e)]
= c0 (e)
The ￿rst order condition in this setting is the similar to the one obtained in




￿ (e)￿[U￿ (e) ￿ c(e)] which can be
interpreted as the marginal bene￿t of decreasing ambiguity.








￿ (e)[U￿ (e) ￿ c(e)] = c0 (e￿)
Ambiguity aversion has an e⁄ect on the optimal e⁄ort which can be highlight
by considering the ambiguity averse agent ￿rst order condition around e￿. By






















￿ (e)￿[U￿ (e) ￿ c(e)]
n X
￿=1





￿ (e)[U￿ (e) ￿ c(e)]
The ￿rst part of V 0(e￿) is the same as in the previous section. The second part
is the di⁄erence between the marginal bene￿ts from the reduction of ambiguity.
6The sign of the e⁄ect is not clear then it could induce an increase or a decrease
of the optimal preventive e⁄ort leading to an increase or a decrease of ambiguity.
4 Conclusion
The e⁄ect of global warming are quite ambiguous meaning that there are several
possible distributions of probability on the state of the world. There are a
growing number of experimental studies that highlight the fact that agents are
ambiguity averse (even actuaries and insurers). In this paper, we show that due
to ambiguity aversion, the agent behaves as an expected utility maximizer with
a distorted belief on the possible scenarii. Indeed she overweights the worse
scenario with respect to the true distribution of scenarii. Then if the marginal
bene￿t of e⁄ort is increasing with the quality of scenarii then the agent valuates
the preventive e⁄ort less than an ambiguity neutral agent. Since the marginal
cost of e⁄ort is the same whatever is the ambiguity aversion, ambiguity averse
agents choose a lower preventive e⁄ort.
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